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In August 2003, the South African government announced its support for the 
provision of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) in the public sector. 
This was a major break-through (antiretrovirals are now explicitly recognised as 
beneficial) but the Cabinet statement was very cautiously worded about actual 
implementation.1 The Ministry of Health has been instructed to develop a 
‘detailed operational plan’ but it is increasingly clear that one of the major 
constraints on the scale and pace of the roll-out will be the amount of resources 
allocated to it. Given the discourse of ‘unaffordability’ which has dogged South 
African AIDS policy making over the past five years (Nattrass, 2004 
forthcoming) it is likely that South Africa will opt for a limited intervention on 
the grounds that resources are best spent elsewhere.   
 
Studies of the cost-effectiveness of HAART in Africa provide some support for 
this position (Creese et al, 2002). The problem with this literature, however, is 
that it does not grapple adequately with the link between treatment and 
prevention, and does not, for the most part, consider the savings for the public 
health sector arising from the introduction of HAART. This South African study 
avoids both these limitations.2 It deliberately poses the question of the costs of 
treating all who need it, rather than the standard cost-effectiveness question of 
how to spend the marginal dollar in the health sector. AIDS constitutes a major 
public health crisis and challenges the very basis of social solidarity in South 
Africa. For this reason, the central question which needs to be addressed as soon 
as possible – and through a broad process of social participation – is not whether 
the marginal dollar should be allocated to AIDS treatment or some other 
priority, but rather whether society is prepared to mobilise the additional 
resources (including through higher taxation) required to provide HAART to all 
those who need it.  
 
 
                                                 
1 See discussion in the Mail and Guardian, August 15-21, 2003. 
2 This builds on earlier work by Geffen et al (2003) and draws on Nattrass (2004, forthcoming). Note 
that there are several other studies of the cost of HAART in South Africa. These use different 
assumptions about treatment regimens and have lower roll-out rates. See Boulle et al (2003) for a 
review. None of these studies poses a link between treatment and prevention.  
 
 2
The Link between AIDS Prevention and 
Treatment 
 
This study draws on the output of a demographic model (ASSA2000 
Interventions Model3) of the impact of various AIDS interventions. The model 
assumes that people who have experienced voluntary counselling and testing 
(VCT) subsequently modify their sexual behaviour (although this wears off over 
time for those who test HIV-negative) (Johnson and Dorrington, 2002). The 
relevant parameters for behaviour change were drawn from randomised control 
trials in Kenya, Tanzania and Trinidad (VTCESG, 2000) and from European 
data (De Vincenzi, 1994). This, together with the fact that people on HAART 
have lower viral loads and thus are less infectious (Vernazza et al, 2000; Hart et 
al, 1999), results in a HAART programme having a significant predicted impact 
in terms of preventing new HIV infections (see Figure 1). Marseille et al (2002) 
caution against this kind of conclusion, and warn that the benefits of reduced 
viral load have to be balanced against longer life expectancy for people on 
HAART. The ASSA2000 Interventions Model addresses this concern by 
assuming that HAART patients remain sexually active throughout their 
extended lives.    
 
There is growing acceptance of the proposition that more people are likely to 
participate in VCT if there is hope of treatment (e.g. Harvard Consensus 
Statement, 2001). De Cock et al (2002) note, ‘the advent of therapy in 
industrialised countries has greatly increased motivation for people to be tested 
for HIV, and has reduced stigma associated with the disease’. Farmer et al 
(2001) likewise found that the provision of HAART in rural Haiti resulted in a 
greater demand for VCT. A pilot HAART programme in Khayelitsha (an 
African township in Cape Town) has similarly resulted in an uptake in VCT, 
AIDS activism and lower stigma (Coetzee and Boulle, 2003). Some analysts 
(including Marseille et al (2002)), however, worry that the presence of a 
HAART treatment programme will result in people becoming less fearful of 
HIV-infection because of treatment possibilities, i.e. that they will start 
manifesting ‘HIV optimism’, and thus practice riskier sex.  
 
The source of this concern are studies in developed countries showing that 
HAART may have contributed to the increase in risky sexual behaviour amongst 
                                                 
3 The ASSA2000 Interventions Model was designed by Leigh Johnson and Rob Dorrington at the 
University of Cape Town. It includes various parameters of heterosexual behaviour (such as the 
probability that a partner comes from a particular risk group, the number of sexual partners per 
annum, the age of the partner and the probability that a condom is used during intercourse). Relevant 
South African data was obtained from the Demographic and Health Survey, the antenatal clinic survey 
and the best available estimates regarding mortality. The model is still being developed, and remains 
provisional. 
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a minority of men who have sex with men (MSM) (Page-Shafer et al, 1999; 
Stolte et al, 2002; Perez et al, 2002; CIDPC, 2002; Dubois-Arber et al, 2002). 
However, these results have to be treated with caution as they are typically 
cross-sectional and subject to selection bias. The best available study of the 
relationship between the availability of HAART and possible HIV optimism 
amongst MSM is that by the International Collaboration on HIV Optimism 
(2003). This study found no consistent relationship between HIV optimism and 
HIV status (thus highlighting the heterogeneous nature of the response of MSM 
to HAART) and mean optimism scores were low in all places. According to the 
authors:   
 
‘What is striking about this finding is that these gay men were 
recruited in cities where HAART had been widely available for 4 
years at the time of the survey. Despite the dramatic and visible 
reduction in HIV-related mortality and morbidity in these cities since 
1997, only a few gay men expressed ‘HIV optimism’. Far from being 
optimistic, most gay men appeared to be realistic about the benefits of 
these drugs’ (2003: 548).  
 
 
Figure 1:  HIV infections averted by the different HIV/AIDS prevention 







































In all countries except Canada, mean optimism scores were higher (but still in 
the pessimistic range) for MSM who reported unprotected anal intercourse 
(UAI) with a casual partner than for those who did not. However, as the study 
notes, causality could not be established from this kind of cross-sectional 
analysis: ‘It is impossible to say whether HIV optimism triggered high-risk 
behaviour or whether treatments optimism was used as a post-hoc rationalization 
to justify sexual risk-taking’ (ibid: 549).  A similar point was made by Laporte 
(2002) in response to earlier studies. 
 
In short, the view that HAART could easily result in a significant increase in 
risky sexual behaviour amongst MSM appears to be little more than a ‘moral 
panic’. There is no scientific basis for assuming that the advent of HAART has 
resulted in significant increased risk behaviour amongst MSM in high-income 
countries. There is even less basis for assuming that a possible behavioural 
response of a small minority of MSM is likely to be replicated on a significant 
scale in most developing countries where the dynamics of the HIV pandemic are 
very different. The fact that MSM on HAART are far more likely to engage in 
high risk sex than heterosexuals on HAART (Laporte, 2002: 15), together with 
evidence showing that MSM of non-Western nationality are less likely to 
engage in high-risk sex than their western counterparts (Stolte, 2002: 20), 
suggests that the problem (to the extent that it exists at all) may be located 
within a particular sexual sub-culture – and that this sub-culture has little 
obvious relevance for the African epidemic. It is too great a leap of logic to 
argue that because of a hypothetical link between HAART and risky sexual 
behaviour (for which there is little, if any, evidence) we should not consider the 
widespread use of HAART in developing countries.  
  
 
Including Hospital Costs 
 
One of the key differences between the South African study reported here and 
most other cost-effectiveness studies in Africa (see Creese et al, 2002), is that 
total hospital costs associated with AIDS are included in the calculation. Studies 
which consider only the direct cost of the intervention (such as that of Marseille 
et al, 2002) are effectively looking at cost-effectiveness through the eyes of a 
donor-driven intervention. The public sector health costs of treating AIDS-
related opportunistic infections simply do not enter into the calculation. While 
this may be a reasonable assumption to make for those African countries with 
limited health infrastructure and limited fiscal resources for fighting the AIDS 
epidemic, it is not an appropriate starting point for analysing a middle-income 
economy like South Africa which is already spending money on AIDS-related 
opportunistic infections. Significant health care resources will continue to be 
expended on addressing the health needs of people living with AIDS. This must 
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be taken into account in any cost-benefit analysis of an AIDS intervention that 
includes HAART. The modelling exercise reported here indicates that when the 
costs of treating AIDS-related opportunistic infections are included, the case for 
including HAART is compelling.  
 
With regard to MTCTP, it has been demonstrated that once total health costs 
(i.e. the costs of the intervention plus the costs of treating HIV-positive children 
for opportunistic infections) are compared to a no-intervention scenario (i.e. just 
the cost of treating HIV-positive children for opportunistic infections), then it 
becomes clear that government would save resources by introducing MTCTP 
(Skordis and Nattrass, 2002; Nattrass, 2004 forthcoming). This is simply 
because the costs of dealing with the AIDS-related illnesses of HIV-positive 
children are high in relation to the cost of preventing them from becoming HIV-
positive in the first place. Including hospitalisation costs in the calculation is 
thus very important when thinking about affordability.  
 
Table 1 provides information on the average annual cost of two AIDS 
intervention scenarios (one with HAART, the other without). Note that total 
costs for VCT and MTCTP are lower for the scenario which includes HAART. 
This is because of the impact of HAART on reducing the number of new HIV 
infections. The total costs of a STD programme, however, rises under the 
scenario which includes HAART (because of the higher number of sexually 
active people). The table includes an upper- and lower-bound estimate for the 
hospitalisation costs of treating AIDS-related illnesses. The upper-bound 
estimate was based on information from an urban hospital (in Soweto) of the 
costs of treating people at different stages of AIDS-illness (Karstaedt et al, 
1996; Kinghorn et al, 1996). It assumes no rationing of treatment for AIDS 
patients and is thus a ‘worst-case’ scenario from a cost perspective. The lower-
bound estimate is based on a World Bank estimate of the cost of treating 
opportunistic infections (in Stage 4 of the disease) in higher-income developing 
countries (Haacker, 2001). The actual costs (which are impossible to ascertain 
with any level of precision) probably lie somewhere within this large range. This 
is unsatisfactory, but unavoidable.  
 
In this regard, it is worth noting the story (attributed to Lewis Carroll) about the 
young boy who estimates that there are 1,004 pigs in a field: ‘“You can’t be sure 
about the four”, he is told. “And you’re as wrong as ever,” says the boy, “it’s 
just the four I can be sure about ‘cause they’re here, grubbing under the window. 
It’s the thousand I isn’t pruffickly sure about.”’ (cited in Boyle, 2001: 51). 
However, if the objective is to estimate with a reasonable degree of certainty 
that the number of pigs in the field lies between, say, 800 and 1,200, then the 
need for pin-point accuracy is reduced. The best we can do with regard to 
estimating hospitalisation costs is this kind of ball-park (pig-field?) estimate. 
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Leaving them out altogether is even less satisfactory as it effectively ignores a 
crucial component of the overall cost-benefit calculation. For example, it has 
been estimated that the Brazilian HAART programme saved the health sector 
almost $1.1 billion between 1997 and 2001 by reducing opportunistic infections 
(Galvao, 2002: 1862). As the total cost of the antiretroviral medication 
amounted to $1.4 billion over the same period (loc. cit), it is clear that the 
savings to the health sector are too important to be ignored. They reduce the net 
cost of a public sector programme substantially.  
 
 
Table 1:  Average annual cost of AIDS intervention scenarios (with and 
without HAART) plus hospitalisation costs between 2002 and 2015 (R 
million) 
 
 VCT+STD+MTCTP VCT+STD+MTCTP+ 
HAART 
MTCTP R135 R113 
VCT R20 R17 
Improved treatment of 
STDs 
R103 R112 
HAART R0 R9,883 
Additional Infrastructure, 
public education and 
condom distribution 
R331 R347 
Total Direct Costs R589 R10,472 
   
Public Hospitalisation Costs 
(upper and lower bound)* 
R33,840 – R11,167 R28,196 – R9,305 
Total costs (direct cost 
plus upper and lower 
bound hospitalisation 
costs) 
R34,429 – R11,757 R38,668 – R19,777 
Source: Costing exercise done in conjunction with the ASSA2000 Interventions Model. See 
also Geffen et al (2003). * Lower bound hospitalisation costs reduce the upper bound costs by 
two-thirds (in line with World Bank data provided in Haacker, (2001: 9)). NB: Figures do not 
add up because of rounding. Total costs are in 2001 prices.  
 
 
The Brazilian figures suggest that savings on hospitalisation are substantial but 
not sufficient to outweigh the costs of the drugs.4 The South African case 
                                                 
4 Texiera et al (2003), however, argue that if the cost of ambulatory care is included along with the 
drugs needed to treat opportunistic infections, then the health costs rise to $2 billion – which results in 
HAART actually saving the health sector money.  
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appears to be similar. As can be seen from Table 1, total hospitalisation costs are 
lower in the intervention scenario that includes HAART than they are for the 
one that does not. This is partly because of lower morbidity for people on 
HAART,5 but mainly because of fewer new HIV infections (and associated 
hospitalisation costs). Note that the ‘saving’ is not sufficient to compensate fully 
for the cost of HAART – hence the total cost of the scenario with HAART is 
higher than the scenario that does not. In other words, a HAART intervention 
will not ‘pay for itself’, although it goes a long way towards doing so. The 
difference in total average annual costs experienced by the health sector between 
the two scenarios is R4.2 – R8 billion (for the upper- and lower-bound 
estimates). This net increase needed to expand an AIDS intervention to include 
HAART treatment is less than the R10 billion a year needed to resource a 
HAART intervention. This is because the HAART intervention is able to claw 
back a substantial proportion of the resources spent on it through lower 
hospitalisation expenditure, and lower spending on VCT and MTCTP.  
 
Figure 2 shows the trajectory of total health sector costs (i.e. the cost of the 
interventions plus the cost of treating opportunistic infections) over time. The 
top two lines depict the costs of the two scenarios assuming the upper-bound 
hospitalisation costs. The figure shows that the total cost for the scenario 
including HAART is lower than the costs of the scenario without HAART 
between 2002 and 2007. This is partly because the HAART programme is 
phased in (starting from 20% in 2002 and rolling out to 90% in 2006) which 
means that the drug costs are likewise phased-in. It is also partly the result of the 
fact that the treatment of opportunistic infections for those on HAART is pushed 
forward in time. Costs relating to treating those with full-blown AIDS kick in 
later (which is why the cost of the scenario with HAART eventually exceeds 
that of the scenario without HAART.  
 
If, we assume a lower-bound estimate for hospital costs, then Figure 2 shows 
that the total cost of the scenario with HAART exceeds that for the scenario 
without HAART from 2003 onwards. This is because we are assuming a lower-
level of care for those with opportunistic infections – thus the advantages of 
averting and pushing these costs further in time are smaller.  
 
                                                 
5 Badri et al (2002) have shown that putting patients on HAART reduced the incidence of HIV-1 
associated tuberculosis by more than 80%. A study in Haiti likewise concluded that ‘as elsewhere, 
patients receiving HAART are far less likely to require admission to hospital than are patients with 
untreated HIV disease’ (Farmer et al, 2001: 405). But while patients on HAART will require less 
treatment, they will revert back to a stage of higher AIDS-related morbidity if they become resistant to 
HAART and are forced to stop the treatment. The ASSA2000 Interventions Model assumes that 
people do eventually get pushed out of the HAART programme – and once this happens, they suffer 
the same morbidity patterns as people who never went on it (Johnson and Dorrington, 2002). In other 
words, the modelled benefits in terms of lower morbidity associated with HAART is less than 
suggested by short-term studies of the impact of going onto HAART.  
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Table 2 presents average annual estimates for key variables. If we take the 
upper-bound estimate for hospital costs, then more HIV infections will be 
averted, and at a lower average cost, if an AIDS intervention was expanded to 
include HAART. However, if we take the lower-bound hospitalisation cost, then 
the average cost per HIV infection rises slightly when a HAART programme is 
added. This is because the ‘savings’ to the state in terms of fewer opportunistic 
infection cases is smaller. This means that where a relatively high level of care 
is provided for HIV-positive people suffering from AIDS-related opportunistic 
infections, then the cost per life saved will decline if government introduces a 
HAART programme for all who need it.  
 
Note that the argument has only considered the benefits of HAART from the 
narrow financial perspective of the public health sector. It does not try to put an 
economic value on the fact that fewer orphans would be created,6 or on the extra 
years of life gained by people on HAART, or on the economic value of lives 
saved through lower rates of HIV transmission. If these social benefits had been 
valued, then the economic case in favour of including HAART as part of a 
                                                 
6 As Farmer et al argue with respect to the conventional wisdom that we cannot afford HAART:  
‘Leaving aside all moral arguments, any economic logic that justifies as acceptable the orphaning of 
children is unlikely to be sound, since the cost to society, though difficult to tabulate, is far higher than 
the cost of prolonging parents’ lives so that they can raise their own children’ (2001: 408). 
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broader HIV intervention would be even stronger. The value of this particular 
(albeit limited) economic calculus is that it speaks directly to the government 
budget. The strength of the finding is that even within this narrow frame of 
reference, there is a strong economic case to be made in favour of including a 
HAART programme.  
 
 













1,814,000 2,863,000 1,049,000 
Cumulative 
reductions in AIDS 
deaths (2002-2015) 
415,000 2,859,000 2,444,000 
Number of maternal 
orphans in 2015 
under age 18 
3,108,000 2,195,000 –913,000 
Direct cost per HIV 
infection averted 
R5,000 R51,000 R46,000 
Total cost (2002-
2015)  
R165 – R482 
billion 
(R323.5 billion)*
R277 – R541 
billion ( R409 
billion)* 
R112 – R59 
billion 
 
Total cost per HIV 
infection averted 
R178,300* R142,900* R35,400 
* Mid-point of the upper-bound and lower bound cost estimates in parentheses 
 
 
What are the Budgetary Implications? 
 
Most cost-effectiveness calculations of AIDS interventions are designed to help 
answer the question: how should the marginal dollar (or Rand) be allocated in 
order to save the greatest number of lives. This central economic question is a 
very useful one to ask when resources are absolutely constrained. However 
seemingly technical question is shot through with both implicit and explicit 
moral judgements. If the only objective was to design an AIDS-intervention 
strategy which saved the most lives for the least amount of money, then one 
response might be to deny HIV-positive people access to the public health 
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system altogether!. This could be done on the grounds that the few extra 
(disability adjusted) years of life saved by treating their opportunistic infections 
are not worth the extra cost. The huge bill for hospitalisation costs would then 
be reduced significantly. Once this decision was made, the next step would be to 
consider which intervention saves the most lives for the least amount of money. 
This would be a VCT intervention. Once this programme had been fully rolled 
out, any additional resources would then be allocated to treating STDs, and then 
only if there was still cash available into MTCTP and then finally, into HAART.  
 
One problem with this line of logic is that it fails to question the very framework 
that made the logic necessary in the first place – i.e. the budget constraint. The 
analysis starts with a constraint: you have limited resources, how should you 
manage the trade-offs? This is a reasonable starting point if you are in a Crimean 
war field hospital with no option other than to practice triage. But it is an 
inappropriate metaphor if used to deflect attention from the larger, prior, 
question: ‘how much would it cost South Africa to implement a full-scale AIDS 
intervention which included the provision of HAART for all who need it?’ 
  
Posing this big question, however, immediately raises a further question: what 
are the implications for the budget? According to the estimates reported in Table 
2, a full AIDS prevention and treatment intervention would cost between R277 
billion (lower-bound estimate) and R541.4 billion (upper-bound estimate) over 
the period 2002 to 2015. This amounts to an average of R19.8 billion or R38.7 
billion respectively per year over the period. Given that South Africa’s 
consolidated national and provincial expenditure on health was R28 billion in 
2002/2, this still amounts to a large required increase in government expenditure 
on health – especially when we consider the upper-bound estimate. Is it 
affordable? 
 
Firstly, it is important to note that some of the hospitalisation costs included in 
the total cost estimates are already being born by the public health sector. 
According to a Department of Health Report, 12.5% of the total health budget is 
currently being spent on the costs of hospitalising AIDS patients (2001: 3). The 
demographic and costing model presented here implies that only 20-50%7 of 
HIV-positive people are obtaining the treatment they need. If we were to expand 
government health spending to include the full AIDS intervention including 
HAART programme outlined above (including, of course, non-rationed care for 
those suffering from opportunistic infections), then the South African Treasury 
would need to raise between R14.1 billion and R31 billion – depending on what 
assumptions are made about hospitalisation costs.  
 
                                                 
7 This is for the upper-bound and lower-bound hospitalisation costs respectively.  
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The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2001 (in current prices) was R983 
billion. So we are talking about spending an extra 1.4% – 3.2% of GDP. South 
Africa raised R61 billion in 2001/2 from value-added tax, which implies that the 
South African Revenue Services raises about R4.4 billion for each percent 
levied by VAT. This means that we would need to raise VAT by between 3 to 7 
percentage points in order to fund a full-scale prevention and treatment 
intervention. Total taxation as a percentage of GDP would thus rise from 24.6% 
of GDP to a maximum of 27.8%. While this is a large increase (and the 
macroeconomic implications of it need to be considered seriously before any 
decision is made to increase taxation), it is worth noting that it in comparative 
terms, a tax take of 27.8% of GDP is not out of line with world averages. 
According to World Bank data, 40 out of the 106 countries for which there is 
adequate data have tax revenues as a percentage of GDP higher than this.  
 
An increase in VAT is not necessarily the best way to fund this expenditure 
because poor people consume more of their income than rich people, and thus 
they pay a higher proportion of their income back to the Receiver of Revenue 
than rich people through VAT (even taking into account that some basic goods 
are VAT-exempt). Other means of raising the additional revenue include an 
increase in income tax, or some combination of different taxes, borrowing, 
expenditure cuts in other areas (e.g. defence8), and applications for grants and 
other forms of foreign AID and assistance. The illustrative increase in VAT is 
simply posed here in order to give an easy-to-grasp indication of the broad 
implications for taxation.  
 
 
What About Rationing? 
 
An alternative approach to the one presented here is to propose a much more 
modest HAART intervention which treats fewer people. The 2003 Joint Health 
and Treasury Technical Task Team projection of the cost of a HAART 
programme for South Africa comprised three alternative scenarios assuming 
100%, 50% and 20% coverage respectively (JHTTT, 2003). This suggests that 
government is considering the possibility of rolling out a treatment programme 
to a fraction of those who need it.  
 
Estimated direct costs in the first year of the 100% coverage scenario are within 
the amount allocated by the National Treasury in the 2003/4 budget for AIDS 
treatment. This perhaps suggests that the National Treasury was ‘already 
planning and preparing for a national programme to provide anti-retrovirals to 
                                                 
8 Boulle et al observe that South Africa’s costly arms procurement process could ‘potentially have 
covered the entire cost of an antiretroviral intervention’ (2003: 296), although this is only true for the 
first few years. 
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South Africans’ (Hickey and Ndlovu, 2003: 2). Two qualifications are, however, 
in order. Firstly, given the State President and the Health Minister’s stance on 
antiretrovirals, there may be continued political obstacles to implementation. 
Secondly, given the constraints imposed by the medium-term expenditure 
framework, it is unlikely that the Treasury is contemplating the same kind of 
national AIDS prevention plus HAART programme discussed here. Rationing of 
HAART is thus likely in the short- and medium-term.  
 
The best publicly available estimate of a rationed approach to HAART is that by 
Boulle et al (2002). They estimated the cost of providing HAART to 10% of 
those who become AIDS-symptomatic. They conclude that the total programme 
costs of treating 107,000 people (in 2007) would be about R409 million. This 
amounts to about R3,800 per person on HAART. This is just over half of the 
cost per person on HAART in 2007 (i.e. R6,200) as estimated by the ASSA2000 
Interventions Model because Boulle et al assume only one line of treatment.  
 
In many respects, the data used by Boulle et al are consistent with the data 
presented here. They do not, however, include a link between treatment and 
prevention, and they assume a much more limited treatment regimen. The major 
strategic difference between their approach and the one presented here, is 
however, the scale of the intervention. Rather than start with an estimate of what 
is required in terms of treatment, they start with what they think is ‘feasible’ or 
‘affordable’ given ‘existing budget constraints’. It was, in other words, an 
attempt to get a treatment foot-in-the-door by asking for less resources – rather 
than spelling out what society needs to consider spending in order to provide 
HAART to all who need it. Instead of challenging society to fund a full-scale 
programme, their approach explicitly assumes that this line of action is likely to 
be counter productive. They start with the existing level of health spending, treat 
it as an absolute constraint, and then ask for a marginal shift of resources in 
favour of treating a limited number of people.  
 
They are not alone in advocating this kind of approach. For example, Haacker 
(2001) estimates that total HIV-related health services plus HAART for 3% of 
those who need it, would cost about 1.4% of the GDP in South Africa. This, 
according to Haacker, is affordable. However, as Geffen has pointed out, ‘it 
seems reasonable to ask why aiming for 100% coverage of the HIV-positive 
population …. at less than 5% of GDP should be fiscally unsound’ (2002: 3).  
 
There is no magic formula as to what is, or is not, ‘affordable’. There are always 
budget constraints and trade-offs – but the size and allocation of the government 
budget is far more flexible than implied by certain brands of technical economic 
discourse. Seekings (2003) cites examples of the discourse of unaffordability 
used during every successive debate over the expansion of South Africa’s 
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welfare system since the 1920s. Once the welfare policy had become 
entrenched, what had previously been regarded as ‘unaffordable’ became an 
accepted part of government responsibility to its citizens. This was the case with 
the introduction of non-contributory old-age pensions for white and coloured 
people in 1928, and its extension to Indians and Africans in 1944. South African 
society needs to grasp the nettle concerning what is required to address the 
AIDS pandemic, and how to pay for it. This is a decision that requires social 
reflection and debate. It should not be made by stealth through some limited and 
narrow intervention which does not spell out the costs in terms of how many 
lives are not saved as a result of opting for the cheaper, less radical, intervention.  
 
The other, obvious, problem with a rationing strategy is how will the rationing 
take place? According to what criteria should HAART be allocated to people 
who need it? For example, the Western Cape government generated a debate 
within AIDS-advocacy circles when it was announced in June 2003 that the 
province had sufficient resources to provide HAART to children. There may be 
practical advantages in this policy in that the infrastructure is available (all 
pregnant women in the Western Cape have access to VCT and children are 
reachable through the immunisation programme). However, it is far from clear 
whether these practical advantages outweigh the practical advantages of treating 
entire families – and rolling out the treatment to more sites as more resources 
come available. There are also ethical problems involved in providing life-
prolonging treatments to children whilst denying it to mothers and fathers. It 
sends out a message that only the ‘innocents’ deserve treatment – thus 
contributing further to the stigmatisation of AIDS. Treating all lives as equal is a 
preferable strategy, especially from a human rights perspective.  
 
It is likely that rather than announce an explicit rationing strategy, the 
government may simply choose to ‘roll-out’ a HAART treatment programme to 
very limited numbers of sites and/or at a far slower rate than desired by AIDS 
activists. While it is inevitable that a national HAART programme will have to 
start in urban hospitals (because this is where the best capacity exists to deliver 
such a programme) there is no necessary reason why capacity cannot steadily be 
generated elsewhere – thus facilitating a broader roll-out (see discussion below). 
Unless this happens, an AIDS treatment programme will favour those living 
close to hospitals and will exacerbate urban-rural differentials.  
 
Another way of rationing HAART is to allow doctors to prescribe it, but not to 
embark on a large-scale publicity campaign. If large numbers of HIV-positive 
people fail to get tested, and simply die of opportunistic infections, then the 
actual demand for HAART will be far lower than that projected here. This paper 
presented the ‘worst case’ scenario for the government in terms of HAART 
programme costs. Actual demand is likely to be far lower because of failure to 
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test, reluctance to accept HAART, fear of stigma etc. If the government embarks 
on a treatment programme as a low-priority and low-visibility policy, then take-
up rates are likely to remain low, thus effectively rationing HAART. In this 
scenario, the Treatment Action Campaign and other advocacy groups will 
continue to mobilise for a change of policy, even in the presence of a 
government-funded treatment programme. 
 
 
‘Scaling-up’ the Use of HAART in the Public 
Sector 
 
During 2003, as it became more and more likely that government would be 
forced to introduce HAART in the public sector, the AIDS policy debate shifted 
towards the challenges involved in ‘scaling-up’ a treatment programme. This 
included the need for Brazilian style negotiations with the large pharmaceutical 
companies over the prices of antiretrovirals, and a concerted effort to support the 
domestic production of generics either under voluntary or compulsory licences.9 
The launch in August 2003 of South Africa’s first generic antiretroviral drug 
(containing stavudine) under a voluntary licensing agreement with Bristol-
Myers Squibb was a particularly welcome development.10 As econometric 
analysis of antiretroviral price trends reveals, reliance on ‘corporate 
philanthropy’ does not guarantee long-term sustainability of lower differential 
pricing, and that the introduction of generic competition remains an essential 
factor for price decreases (Lucchini et al, 2003). Ensuring that testing facilities 
(to conduct CD4 cell count tests, viral loads etc) expand in line with demand 
from the health sector, is a further challenge for the private sector and/or public-
private partnerships.11  
 
The implications for the health sector of a full-scale national treatment 
programme are immense. The costing exercise presented here included the cost 
of additional doctors, nurses and counsellors. Hiring extra staff is necessary in 
                                                 
9 Brazil has massively expanded the domestic production of antiretrovirals under voluntary license 
agreements. Between 1999 and 2001, the proportion of antiretrovirals produced in Brazil rose from 
47% (19% of government expenditure on antiretrovirals) to 63% (43% of expenditure). The remainder 
are purchased on the international market (Galvao, 2002: 1864). Brazil has threatened to engage in 
compulsory licensing (i.e. breaking patents) in order to force price concessions from pharmaceutical 
companies, but has yet to do this. The November 2001 decision by the World Trade Organisation to 
allow the use of compulsory licensing in cases of national public health emergencies has further 
strengthened Brazil’s hand – as well as that of other middle-income developing countries (like South 
Africa) which have the industrial capability to produce antiretrovirals if necessary.  
10 The manufacturer, Aspen Pharmacare also has voluntary license agreements with Boehringer 
Ingelheim (for nevirapine) and GlaxoSmithKline (for zidovudine and lamivudine).  
11 When Brazil and Botswana introduced their national treatment programmes, the state was actively 
involved in the setting up and management of additional testing facilities (Galvao, 2002; Ramotlhwa, 
2003).  
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order to ensure that the introduction of a HAART programme does not drain 
much needed financial and human resources from other parts of the health 
system. Additional infrastructure (e.g. consultation rooms) was also included in 
the costing exercise, although it is possible that further unexpected costs may be 
incurred. For example, the theft of antiretrovirals proved to be an unexpected 
problem in Botswana, with the result that they had to be stored in the same way 
as narcotics – thus posing additional expenses on the health system (Ramotlhwa, 
2003).  
 
Most importantly, a national HAART programme needs to be rolled out in a 
way which improves the functioning of the existing health care system – i.e. as a 
vehicle for upgrading (rather than undermining) the health care system. This is 
why it is so important to stress the additional resource requirements associated 
with a treatment roll-out. In addition, the management and monitoring of 
HAART patients needs to be integrated with other programmes, most obviously 
with the treatment of tuberculosis, but also with that of other opportunistic 
infections.  
 
Systemic challenges such as these are serious, but not insurmountable. As the 
Deputy Director General of Health in the Western Cape Provincial Government 
argued at an August 2003 workshop on scaling up antiretrovirals in the public 
sector, the complexity of a HAART intervention should ‘not be exaggerated’ 
(Abdullah, 2003). By mid-2003, the Western Cape had two and a half years of 
experience with pilot treatment programmes reaching over 1,000 HAART 
patients.12 Abdullah (2003) pointed out that medical staff and volunteers were 
very keen to introduce a HAART programme in the public sector, and rolling 
out treatment will constitute a much needed boost to morale.  
 
Boulle (2003) was similarly optimistic about the prospects of rolling out a 
HAART programme in the Western Cape. He argued that the Khayelitsha pilot 
project shows how antiretroviral interventions can be used to improve access to 
health services, and to graduate the level of care (e.g. from PMTCT, to the 
treatment of opportunistic infections, to providing HAART, and now integrating 
the management of TB and AIDS (Boulle, 2003). He argued that a more nurse-
centred HAART programme is possible.  
 
One of the most encouraging lessons of the Western Cape pilot programmes is 
that HAART patients are not overwhelmed by the ‘complexity’ of the treatment 
intervention and understand the need to adhere to the drug regimen. Good 
adherence requires adequate counselling and other support programmes, but the 
                                                 
12 These include the MSF programme in Khayelitsha, other pilot projects in Gugulethu, Grote Schuur 
Hospital, and the Red Cross Children’s Hospital, and clinical trials (e.g. at Somerset and Tygerberg 
hospitals). 
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pilot projects show that good adherence is possible in resource-poor settings 
(Abdullah, 2003; Coetzee and Boulle, 2003). Recent evidence from Gauteng 
points to similar conclusions (Mlongo, 2003). Coetzee and Boulle point out that 
the clinic waiting room becomes a ‘support area’ with patients discussing 
adherence issues and problems relating to overcoming side-effects with each 
other (2003). In addition, HAART patients in Khayelitsha have become 
powerful community advocates of treatment, which has helped reduce stigma 
and encourage disclosure in the area (Coetzee and Boulle, 2003). The 
Botswanan experience also indicates that HAART helps ‘break the cycle of 
denial and infection’, thus strongly supporting prevention (Ramotlhwa, 2003).  
 
There is, of course, always the question as to whether the success of pilot 
projects can be replicated on a larger scale as the treatment programme rolls out 
in 2004 and 2005. In this regard, the experience of Botswana is highly 
instructive. The national treatment programme was initially concentrated in four 
strategically located sites (Gaberone, Francistown, Maun and Serowe) and then 
expanded to include three army facilities and two mining hospitals. A further ten 
hospitals were then identified as additional sites (Ramotlhwa, 2003). After 18 
months of experience with rolling out HAART, the results were very 
encouraging: patient follow-up exceeded 90% and complete viral load 
suppression was recorded in over 85% of patients (Ramotlhwa, 2003).  
 
One of the problems with rolling out a HAART programme by starting with 
well resourced urban hospitals is that many of those who need access to 
treatment will not receive it (at least not for some time). There is, in other words, 
a trade-off between implementing the programme efficiently, and ensuring 
immediate equitable access. Unfortunately, there is no way of ‘balancing’ these 
concerns, because a poorly implemented HAART programme will be of limited 
benefit to patients, and runs to danger of increasing drug resistance. There is no 
real alternative other than to start where the capacity exists for effective 
intervention, and then to expand that capacity as fast as possible to other areas. 
The challenge, of course, is to allocate sufficient resources for developing this 
capacity.  If there is social support to finance a rollout, the extent and pace of the 
HAART rollout would then be determined by operational issues such as clinic 
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